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ABSTRACT 
Double taxation agreements pose a particular analytical problem. 
While they provide a coherent structure that encourages cross-border 
investment, the agreements also provide opportunities for taxpayers to 
avoid their domestic tax obligations. To prevent tax avoidance, some 5 
countries enact domestic general anti-avoidance rules to protect their 
domestic interests. These rules raise questions as to what the 
relationship between the domestic law and the double tax agreement 
is. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs provides Commentary on the 10 
Organisation for Cooperation and Economic Development Model 
Double Tax Agreement. This Commentary sets out an analytical 
framework from which this relationship is to be evaluated. This paper 
argues that the framework is of little practical significance. The paper 
concludes that the weight and usefulness of the Commentary lies in a 15 
guiding principle set out in the Commentary. Consequently, the wider 
interpretative approaches do not practically add to the analysis and 
should be given little weight.  
 
[Double tax agreements; international tax; Committee of Fiscal 20 
Affairs; domestic general anti-avoidance rules] 
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I The Conceptual Problem 
Tax avoidance in cross-border transactions is a growing problem for 
countries worldwide. With business becoming increasingly 
international, there is a greater need for coherent structures that 
facilitate cross-border transactions and help protect economies that are 5 
increasingly fragile and reliant on one another. An example of such a 
structure is double tax treaty networks. These networks are designed 
to prevent international double taxation. International double taxation 
is generally defined as “the imposition of comparable taxes in two or 
more States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter 10 
and for identical periods”.
1
 By eliminating double taxation, the treaties 
encourage economic investment; promote the movement of capital 
and exchange of goods and services; and provide certainty as to the 
taxation that the investments will attract.
2
 
 15 
However, double taxation agreements pose a particular analytical 
problem. This is because they provide opportunities for taxpayers to 
avoid domestic tax obligations and receive undue benefits under the 
treaty. This would be the case where someone acts through a company 
created in another State to obtain benefits that would not be available 20 
directly to the individual alone.
3
 While cross-border investment and 
transactions are attractive to national governments, international tax 
avoidance poses a threat to the integrity of domestic tax systems and 
the flow of revenue governments receive from them.  
 25 
To counter-act undesirable avoidance, countries enact general and 
specific anti-avoidance rules to protect their domestic interests. This 
creates a direct tension between the domestic law and the international 
treaty and raises questions as to the relationship between them.  
 30 
There are two fundamental principles to consider when evaluating 
approaches to the relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-
avoidance rules. First, the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules 
  
1
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary Introduction, at [1] (emphasis added).  
2
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary on Article 1, at [7]. 
3
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9].  
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may undermine the certainty of law and the inviolability of 
agreements struck between nations. This is balanced against the 
domestic interests of a state in maintaining the integrity of their tax 
system and not having their tax revenue exploited by abusive 
taxpayers.
4
 5 
 
The relationship between domestic anti-avoidance rules and double 
tax treaties varies from country to country.
5
 Often commentators 
evaluate this relationship by looking to the explanation laid out in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 10 
Model Commentary. This paper critically evaluates the approaches 
laid down by the Commentary and argues that the interpretative 
framework is unhelpful. The paper then evaluates alternative 
approaches commentators have used to characterise the differing 
relationships between domestic general anti-avoidance rules and 15 
double tax agreements. The paper concludes that these are also 
directed by a factual enquiry and rely on the OECD Model.  
 
The paper also discusses concerns around whether the approach taken 
by the Commentary reflects potential agency capture or undue 20 
influence from sophisticated taxpayers on the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs. The paper argues that despite the analytical framework 
contained in the Commentary, the guiding principle found in 
paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary should be the key and true 
framework for analysis. Finally, the paper evaluates the application of 25 
the guiding principle.  The paper concludes that the principle would 
allow for domestic anti-avoidance rules to be used successfully and in 
line with international obligations. Further, the use of domestic anti-
avoidance rules within this framework would be justified even 
considering concerns around unjustifiable uncertainty and inviolability 30 
of international agreements. Consequently, the paper argues that while 
  
4
 Craig Macfarlane Elliffe “International Tax Avoidance – The Tension between 
Protecting the Tax Base and Certainty of Law” (2011) Journal of Business Law 7 at 
[1.0]. 
5
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [27]. See also: Craig Macfarlane Elliffe 
“International Tax Avoidance – The Tension between Protecting the Tax Base and 
Certainty of Law” (2011) Journal of Business Law 7 at [1.0]. 
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the Commentary is central to OECD member’s approaches to double 
tax agreements, the guiding principle should be the only principle 
given weight when evaluating the relationship between domestic anti-
avoidance rules and double tax agreements. 
 5 
II OECD Model Commentary 
The OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital (“Model 
Convention”) and associated commentary (“Commentary”) was 
developed in recognition of the need to clarify and standardise the 
“fiscal situation of taxpayers who engage in activities in other 10 
countries”.
6
 The Council of the OECD recommended that member 
countries should conform to the Convention when concluding double 
taxation agreements.
7
 Since its inception, the Model Convention has 
received worldwide recognition and has influenced negotiations 
involving non-member countries.
8
  The Committee on Fiscal Affairs 15 
developed the Commentary to help interpretation of the provisions 
and aid application of them.
9
 One area that the Commentary aims to 
clarify is how countries are able to protect themselves against 
improper use of the Convention by taxpayers.
10
 
 20 
One way in which countries try to protect against avoidance of 
domestic tax liability is through general anti-avoidance rules within 
their domestic law. General anti-avoidance rules have operated in a 
number of common law jurisdictions including Canada,
11
 New 
Zealand,
12
 South Africa,
13
 and Australia.
14
 The International Fiscal 25 
Association has noted that without exception, domestic general anti-
avoidance rules can have international effect and there is “no 
  
6
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary Introduction, at [1].  
7
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary Introduction, at [3]. 
8
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary Historical Background, at [14]. 
9
 OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary Introduction, at [3].  
10
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [7 – 12]. 
11
 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 c 1 (Canada), s 245. 
12
 Income Tax Act 2007, s BG1 and GB1. 
13
 Income Tax Act 1962 (South Africa), s103.  
14
 There are a variety of general anti-avoidance rules in Australian legislation. These 
include the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), Part IVA and Fringe Benefits 
Tax Assessment Act 1968 (Cth), s 67.  
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distinction in their application depending on the national or 
international effect”.
15
 However, in the light of double tax agreements, 
the effect of a domestic general anti-avoidance rule is a subject of 
much debate.  
 5 
The Commentary on Article 1 of the Model Convention sets out an 
interpretative framework to help analyse the relationship between 
domestic general anti-avoidance rules and double tax agreements. The 
Commentary acknowledges that domestic general anti-avoidance rules 
raise two questions for consideration.
16
 First, whether the benefits of 10 
the treaty must be granted even if they do constitute an abuse of the 
treaty provisions.
17
 Secondly, whether the domestic anti-avoidance 
rules themselves conflict with treaties.
18
 
 
For the majority of countries, the second issue will be the only 15 
question at stake. This is because any domestic implementation of the 
treaty would require any abuse of it to be treated as an abuse of the 
domestic law provisions themselves.
19
 Consequently, this paper 
focuses on the second question. 
A The two approaches 20 
The OECD Commentary outlines two approaches to help evaluate the 
compatibility of domestic anti-avoidance rules.
20
 The Commentary 
suggests that the countries will assess the relationship between tax 
treaties and domestic anti-avoidance rules on the basis of how the 
general anti-avoidance rule operates. According to Elliffe, if a general 25 
anti-avoidance rule provides the ability for the reconstruction of an 
abusive transaction (which would result in the original transaction 
being void) the country will fall under the factual approach.
21
 
  
15
 International Fiscal Association “Cahier De Droit Fiscal International” (2010) vol 
95a at 22.  
16
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9]. 
17
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.1]. 
18
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.1]. 
19
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.2]. 
20
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.2] and [9.3].  
21
 Elliffe “International Tax Avoidance” above n 4 at [2.2]. 
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Alternatively, if a general anti-avoidance rule results in the 
nullification of the abusive transaction, the general anti-avoidance rule 
will fall under the interpretative approach.
22
 
1 Factual Approach  
The first approach outlined is the factual approach. The factual 5 
approach is where the domestic general anti-avoidance rule forms part 
of the domestic tax laws that determine which facts of the transaction 
give rise to tax liability.
23
 The approach is found in paragraph 9.2 of 
the Commentary, which states:
24
 
 10 
[t]o the extent these anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic 
domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which 
facts give rise to a tax liability, they are not addressed in tax 
treaties and are therefore not affected by them…  
 15 
As a result, there is likely to be no conflict between the domestic rules 
and the double taxation agreement. This is because the anti-avoidance 
rule itself is being used to identify the factual basis on which tax 
liability is based. Once the factual basis is established, the treaty will 
be applied. Consequently, these rules are not addressed in tax treaties 20 
and are therefore not affected by them.
25
  
 
Commentators have argued that New Zealand courts would take a 
factual approach for the following reasons.
26
 First, the overriding 
nature of double tax agreements in New Zealand legislation suggests 25 
that there will be situations where the domestic anti-avoidance rule 
will conflict with the treaty (that is, the definition in the treaty clearly 
  
22
 Elliffe above n 4 at [2.2]. 
23
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [22.1]. 
24
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.2]. 
25
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5: Relationship between Tax 
Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures” in Guglielmo Maisto (ed) Tax 
Treaties and Domestic Law (IBFD, Netherlands, 2006) at [5.3]. 
26
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble “General Anti-Avoidance Rules and Double Tax 
Agreements: a New Zealand Perspective” (2009) Revenue Law Journal 19 at 7. 
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indicates an outcome that is at variance to New Zealand law).
27
 
Secondly, New Zealand has a history of paying regard to the 
Commentary of the OECD Model, which has the factual approach as 
its fundamental basis.
28
 Thirdly, New Zealand’s domestic general anti-
avoidance rule provides the Commissioner of Inland Revenue with the 5 
power to adjust the taxable income of the taxpayer and recharacterise 
transactions to “counteract any tax advantage obtained by that person 
from or under that arrangement”.
29
  
 
The ability to reconstruct transactions is central to the distinction of 10 
the approaches. Another example of a reconstruction power is the 
application of a domestic general anti-avoidance rule that would result 
in a redetermination of the taxpayer who found to be receiving the 
income.
30
 In these situations, the double taxation agreement would 
apply, but would take into account the factual changes in the basis of 15 
liability.
31
  
 
2 Interpretative Approach  
The second approach is the interpretative approach where the abuse is 
treated as abuse of the treaty itself and not of domestic law.
32
 There is 20 
no provision under domestic law to recharacterise the income. Instead, 
the abusive transaction will be disregarded.
33
 The second approach is 
qualified by the view that tax legislation, in its domestic and treaty 
forms will not be interpreted to apply to transactions that lack 
economic substance or a bona fide business purpose.
34
 In this 25 
situation, the general anti-avoidance rule operates to assume no 
  
27
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble “General Anti-Avoidance Rules and Double Tax 
Agreements: a New Zealand Perspective”, above n 29, at 7. 
28
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble, above n 29, at 7. 
29
 Income Tax Act 2007, s GA1.  
30
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [22.1]. 
31
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [22.1]. 
32
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.3]. 
33
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble, above n 29, at 6. Examples of countries that may 
follow this approach are the United Kingdom and the United States. 
34
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.5]; see also Craig Elliffe and John 
Prebble, above n 29, at 7. 
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transaction occurred.
35
 The likely result is that the court will substitute 
the transaction with one that does not result in tax avoidance.
36
 
However, as defeating extra taxation could fall within the scope of a 
bona fide business purpose, a clear understanding of what the test 
requires is important.   5 
B Problems with these approaches 
There are two problems with this framework. First, the test of the 
transaction requiring a bona fide business purpose or economic 
substance imports a factual analysis into the interpretative approach 
anyway. The test mirrors the guiding principle found within the 10 
Commentary. The guiding principle applies to both approaches. 
Consequently, transactions under the factual approach will also be 
subject to the requirements of a bona fide business purpose or 
economic substance. Any consideration of the test would require 
analysis of the factual basis of the transaction.  This suggests that the 15 
distinction between the approaches may not be a true distinction at all. 
The fact the same factual enquiry applies to either approach highlights 
the artificiality in the distinction.  
 
Secondly, neither approach constructs a clear relationship or hierarchy 20 
between the domestic general anti-avoidance rule and the treaty. In 
fact, central to the application of both approaches is the “way in which 
a country’s domestic general anti-avoidance rule actually operates 
when invoked in circumstances of abuse”.
37
 The only difference 
between the two approaches appears to be whether a jurisdiction 25 
grants reconstruction powers to its Commissioner. It is artificial in a 
treaty interpretation context to have this power as the pinnacle point of 
difference. This is because the power only partially describes the 
operation of the general anti-avoidance rule. The operation of the rule 
domestically is only an element of the wider context of the treaty 30 
itself. As a result, focus on the power of reconstruction fails to 
consider the wider relationship of the rules and raises questions as to 
the necessity or usefulness of the approaches. 
  
35
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble, above n 29, at 6. 
36
 Craig Elliffe and John Prebble, above n 29, at 7. 
37
 Elliffe “International Tax Avoidance” above n 4 at [2.2]. 
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III An alternative approach 
The approaches set out in the Commentary are abstract and general. 
To understand the result of the Commentary’s commentators look to 
individual transactions occurring with specific and differing domestic 5 
contexts and the corresponding treaty framework.  
 
In the 2010 International Fiscal Association Rome Congress, 42 out of 
44 countries reached the conclusion that the domestic general anti-
avoidance rules can be reconciled with their treaty obligations.
38
 10 
While there seems to be agreement as to the ability of general anti-
avoidance rules to apply to international transactions, there is 
divergence as to the extent of their application. This divergence arises 
from the fact that countries incorporate international treaties 
differently. Countries provide for domestic general anti-avoidance 15 
rules through statutory enactment or judicial decisions, while other 
countries do not have a domestic general anti-avoidance rules at all. 
Further, some countries have expressly defined the relationship 
between general anti-avoidance rules and tax treaties, while others are 
silent on the issue. Consequently, commentators have looked to 20 
consolidate the operation of domestic anti-avoidance rules in the 
context of double taxation agreements by looking to how domestic 
jurisdictions have expressed the relationship.  
A Express legislative override 
The first category is where the country’s legislation provides an 25 
express legislative override. In this case, the general anti-avoidance 
rule prevails. An example is Australia’s legislation, which provides:
39
 
 
The provisions of this Act have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent with those provisions contained in the Assessment 30 
Act (other than Part IVA of that Act) or in an Act imposing 
Australian tax (emphasis added). 
  
38
 International Fiscal Association “Cahier De Droit Fiscal International” (2010) vol 
95a at 21. The two countries that reported differing positions were the Netherlands 
and Portugal.  
39
 International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), s 4(2) as amended in 1995. 
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In other words, treaties will override Australia’s domestic income tax 
legislation unless the transaction triggers the general anti-avoidance 
rule contained in Part IVA of the International Tax Agreements Act 
1953.  5 
 
Similarly, following amendments made in 2005, Canada’s general 
anti-avoidance rule applies to any tax benefits obtained under a 
treaty.
40
 As a result, Canadian jurisprudence suggests that no conflict 
between tax treaties and the general anti-avoidance rule will arise. 10 
Interestingly, Antle v R held that the general anti-avoidance rule would 
apply notwithstanding the fact that the treaty in question was 
concluded prior to the amendments.
41
 
 
Express legislative overrides are inconsistent with the position taken 15 
in the 1989 OECD Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. The 
Committee declared its strong opposition to domestic legislative 
overrides, even where such legislation will counteract abuse of the 
treaty.
42
 The reluctance of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to support 
express overrides suggests that while there is a place for domestic 20 
general anti-avoidance rules to operate in the double tax treaty 
context, there still needs to be consideration and balance with the 
wider international law considerations. 
B Where the treaty overrides the domestic general anti-avoidance 
rule 25 
The second category is where the treaty automatically overrides the 
general anti-avoidance rule in cross-border transactions. An example 
of this category is the Netherlands, where the prevailing rule is 
  
40
 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 c 1 (Canada), s245 (4).  
41
 Antle v R; Marquis-Antle Spousal Trust v R; Antle and another v R, (2009) 12 
ITLR 359 (TCC) at [87]. 
42
 OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Tax Treaty Override 
C(89)146/FINAL (1989). See also: Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghel “Chapter 5: 
Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures” in 
Guglielmo Maisto Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (IBFD, Netherlands, 2006) at 5.3 
pg 103.  
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“[because tax treaty provisions are] binding upon everyone, they 
prevail over national law”.
43
 
 
Similarly, Portugal has taken the constitutional view that international 
law prevails over domestic provisions.
44
 Thus, while the domestic rules 5 
determine the factual tax liability of a taxpayer domestically, they do not 
extend to the double tax treaty context without specific provision in the 
treaty.
45
 
 
There is some merit in this position. States should not be able to avoid 10 
their treaty obligations by enacting domestic general anti-avoidance 
rules.
46
 However, the guiding principle in Paragraph 9.5 of the 
Commentary seems to undermine this approach. This is because the 
guiding principle seems to suggest that a domestic general anti-
avoidance rule could aid countries in maintaining their international 15 
obligations. Paragraph 9.5 states that:
47
 
 
The benefits of a double taxation convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain 
transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable 20 
tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in 
these circumstances would be contrary to the object and 
purpose of the relevant provisions. 
 
Consequently, this suggests that a rule that prevents tax avoidance from 25 
falling within the scope of the guiding principle should become an 
obligation of states. The complete override of domestic law may be 
inconsistent with this as it would prevent any application of a domestic 
general anti-avoidance rule and would render the guiding principle 
  
43
 Faustina G. I. Peters and Aart Roelofsen “Dutch Branch Report”  n12, 551 at 561. 
44
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [27.3]. 
45
 Note, Commentary on Article 1 at [27.8] directly states, “whenever the prevailing 
hierarchy of tax conventions regarding internal law is not respected, Portugal will 
not adhere to the conclusions on the clarification of domestic anti-abuse rules 
incorporated in the Commentary on Article 1”. 
46
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
47
 Commentary on Article 1, above n 2, at [9.5].  
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inoperable without the required anti-avoidance rule being included in the 
treaty.  
C Cases of conflict 
The remaining countries fall within a category where the relationship 
between the general anti-avoidance rule and the treaty is unclear. Brian 5 
Arnold has described the approach of these countries as creating a 
position where treaties will prevail over the domestic general anti-
avoidance rule in the event of a conflict.
48
 The merit of this type of 
analysis is that it looks directly to how the rules are utilised in preventing 
the abuse of unintended benefits of tax treaties. 10 
 
An example of a case of conflict is in relation to the Canada/New 
Zealand double tax treaty.
49
 Article 3(2) of the treaty provides:
50
 
 
In determining, for the purposes of Articles 10, 11, or 12, 15 
whether dividends, interest or royalties are beneficially owned 
by a resident of the Contracting State, dividends, interest or 
royalties in respect of which a trustee is subject to tax in that 
Contracting State should be treated as being beneficially owned 
by that trustee… 20 
 
Here, in absence of an assertion that the treaty is being abused, the 
conflict between the treaty and the general anti-avoidance rule must be 
resolved in favour of the treaty. This is because Canada and New 
Zealand have expressly agreed in Article 3(2) that if a Canadian 25 
trustee derives a New Zealand sourced dividend which is subject to 
tax liability in Canada, then New Zealand will treat the trustee as the 
beneficial owner of the dividend for the purpose of the treaty. This 
could preclude application of New Zealand’s general anti-avoidance 
rule to recharacterise the dividend as derived by a third party, which 30 
may result in New Zealand tax liability to that third party. Thus, 
unless the treaty is itself abused, the explicit definition in the treaty 
  
48
 BJ Arnold, “Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance; the 2003 Revisions to the 
Commentary to the OECD Model” (2004) 58 (6) Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation, Amsterdam 224, 251. 
49
 Elliffe “International Tax Avoidance” above n 4 at [2.2]. 
50
 Double Taxation Relief (Canada) Order 1981. 
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and the treaty itself should prevail over the general anti-avoidance 
rule. This will be a case-by-case analysis. 
 
However, this approach also looks to how the general anti-avoidance 
rules operate. An example where a domestic general anti-avoidance rule 5 
denied treaty benefits is the Canadian case of RMM Canadian 
Enterprises v The Queen.
51
 As the decision was before Canada’s 
legislative amendments,
52
 the case continues to offer insight into the 
relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-avoidance rules in the 
absence of an express legislative override. In this case, the taxpayer, a US 10 
company, sold the shares of its Canadian subsidiary as a means of 
stripping the surplus the subsidiary accrued. This was done in an attempt 
to avoid Canadian withholding tax. The tax authorities applied the 
Canadian general anti-avoidance rule to treat the gain on the sale of the 
shares as a dividend to the extent the sales proceeds exceeded the paid up 15 
capital of the shares. Accordingly, Article X of the Canada – US treaty 
applied to reduce the rate of Canadian withholding tax on the deemed 
dividend from the statutory rate of 25% to the treaty rate of 10%. The 
Canadian Tax Court’s analysis was in accordance with the new 
Commentary.
53
 Application of the domestic anti-avoidance rule 20 
established that the gain was a dividend for Canadian tax purposes and 
the treaty applied as if the amount were a dividend (subject to 10% 
withholding tax) and not a gain (which would not have been subject to 
tax). 
 25 
In the case, the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule uses a primary-
purpose test, whereas the treaty uses a “one of the main purposes” test.
 54
 
It was open to the Court to find that the general anti-avoidance rule did 
  
51
 RMM Canadian Enterprises v The Queen 97 DTC 302 (TCC); Elliffe 
“International Tax Avoidance” above n 4 at [4]. 
52
 Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms, s 33. The section contains the power 
to enact an express legislative override in certain situations. For consideration of 
how the general anti-avoidance rule operates post-amendment, see Evans v The 
Queen (2005) TCC 684 per Bowman J. 
53
 Elliffe “International Tax Avoidance” above n 4 at [4]. 
54
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
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not apply because there was no misuse or abuse of the Income Tax Act.
 55
 
Nonetheless, the Court denied the treaty benefits. However, as the 
decision was in the Court of first instance and was not appealed, it is 
unclear whether the higher Canadian Courts would confirm the decision 
and reasoning behind the application of the general anti-avoidance rule.
 56
 5 
 
The application of the general anti-avoidance rule despite no abuse of the 
Income Tax Act can also arguably be justified with reference to article 
3(2) of the Treaty that provides that undefined terms in the treaty have 
the meaning that they have under domestic law unless the context 10 
requires otherwise.
57
 The issue would then become whether the 
recharacterisation of an amount under the domestic general anti-
avoidance rule establishes the meaning of the general anti-avoidance rule 
for the purposes of the treaty.
58
 If so, there would be no conflict between 
domestic law and the treaty and the taxpayer’s argument would be 15 
ineffective. In the alternative, the context of the treaty could leave open 
an argument that the treaty requires the use of a different meaning from 
any meaning determined pursuant to the general anti-avoidance rule.
59
 
Due to the factual enquiry that both the guiding principle and the OECD 
Commentary require, it seems such an argument is unlikely to be 20 
successful. If domestic law establishes the factual basis of liability, and 
this is to remain consistent with the Convention, then any other meaning 
would undermine both the domestic law and the factual enquiry of the 
Commentary. Thus, the domestic general anti-avoidance rule is likely to 
apply regardless.  25 
 
IV Propaganda and capture: a concern to be considered 
It is important to consider the potential taxpayer influence on the 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs in creating the analytical framework. The 
effectiveness of the Commentary’s guidance in establishing a practical 30 
understanding of the relationship remains questionable. This raises 
concerns about undue influence from taxpayers, or agency capture, of the 
  
55
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
56
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
57
 Double Taxation Relief (Canada) Order 1981. 
58
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
59
 Brian Arnold and Stef Van Weeghal “Chapter 5”, above n 25, at [5.3]. 
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Committee of Fiscal Affairs. The reason is that the lack of clear direction 
can increase the ability to use the tax treaties to receive undue benefits. 
A Defining agency capture 
A captured agency is a regulatory body unduly influenced by the 
interest groups directly affected by its decisions.
60
 In the Model 5 
Commentary context, this would mean that taxpayers have unduly 
influenced the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. This would be difficult to 
prove definitively, but one can look to the Commentary and the effect 
of the interpretative framework to address whether this should be a 
concern. 10 
B Does the Commentary raise this concern? 
The interpretative framework alone is what raises these concerns. 
However, this paper argues that the guiding principle mitigates these 
concerns. This is because it is still key to the analysis and can add 
much to the enquiry. Thus, the interpretative framework may be 15 
practically unhelpful, but the Commentary as a whole may still be of 
use. 
 
V The importance of a guiding principle 
 20 
As noted earlier, the guiding principle found in paragraph 9.5 of the 
Commentary states:
61
 
 
that the benefits of a double tax Convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain 25 
transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable 
tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in the 
circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of 
the relevant provisions. 
  
60
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61
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18 Defining the Relationship between Domestic General Anti-Avoidance Rules 
  and Double Tax Agreements 
 
 
A A treaty anti-avoidance rule 
A State does not have to grant the benefit of a double tax treaty when the 
arrangement constitutes an abuse of the provisions of the treaty.
62
 The 
test to apply is whether “a main purpose” of the transaction is to secure a 
more favourable tax position contrary to the object and purpose of the 5 
relevant provisions.
63
  
 
It is arguable that the guiding principle establishes a treaty anti-
avoidance rule.
64
 A literal reading of the principle would suggest that 
a taxpayer could not rely on the treaty where the main purpose of the 10 
transaction is to secure a more favourable tax position than that 
intended by the provisions of the treaty.  
 
This paragraph is prefaced with a caveat that it will not be lightly 
assumed that the taxpayer is entering into abusive transactions. The 15 
principle requires tax administrators and the courts to exercise caution 
and prudence before exercising their powers to categorise a transaction as 
being abusive of the object and purpose of the treaty.
65
 Examination of 
whether the favourable tax position is contrary to the object and purpose 
of the relevant provisions will involve considering the reasons for those 20 
provisions and whether the transactions frustrate or abuse the treaty.
66
 
 
Another way of interpreting the paragraph is that the principle establishes 
a test transactions should meet before a domestic general anti-avoidance 
rule will apply.  This would provide a balanced and testable standard to 25 
which transactions would need to meet before a domestic anti-avoidance 
rule would apply.
67
 This test is that domestic anti-avoidance rules should 
apply to a transaction in the context of a tax treaty only if the main 
purpose of the transaction is to secure treaty benefits that will result in 
  
62
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63
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65
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defeating the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty. 
Thus, a domestic anti-avoidance rule that does not meet the test of 9.5 
would conflict with the provisions of tax treaties and should be precluded 
from being applied.
68
 This argument is attractive because it contains a 
standard for countries to adhere to in maintaining their international 5 
obligations and domestic protections. Countries should not design or 
apply their domestic anti-avoidance rules so broadly that treaty benefits 
are denied where they should not be. The guiding principle demonstrates 
that a limitation on the use of domestic anti-avoidance rules in the 
context of tax treaties is necessary. A country should not be able to avoid 10 
its treaty obligations by taking the position that virtually all transactions 
are abusive and all of its domestic tax rules are anti-avoidance rules. The 
guiding principle provides the ambit of general anti-avoidance rule 
application and is helpful in analysing the approach to be taken. 
 15 
There are potential areas of concern with reliance on the guiding 
principle. At the very least, application of the principle requires a balance 
in analysis. This is because tax authorities and courts cannot be too quick 
to deny treaty benefits with respect to transactions.
69
 It is important to 
remember that tax planning is a legitimate behaviour and taxpayers can 20 
(and should) be expected to arrange their affairs to pay the minimum 
amount of tax. The Privy Council noted that the law does not require 
people to arrange transactions in order to incur the greatest possible tax 
liability available.
70
 Further concerns as to the guiding principles 
operation need to be addressed in detail.  25 
1 Lower threshold 
First, what if there is a lower threshold from a domestic general anti-
avoidance rule than that found in the treaty?  
 
  
68
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Louis University Law Journal; Victoria University of Wellington  Legal Research 
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The differences between New Zealand’s approach and that of Canada 
and Australia are somewhat marked. The New Zealand domestic test of 
“more than a merely incidental purpose” of tax avoidance is lower than 
the focus in the Commentary. The focus in the Commentary is whether a 
main purpose of the transaction was to secure a more favourable tax 5 
treatment inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty 
provisions. The domestic law test has a lower threshold so that if tax 
avoidance is one of the purpose or effects of a transaction it can be 
voided, if the tax avoidance purpose or effect present is not merely 
incidental. It is thus possible to have a situation where the test under the 10 
domestic anti-avoidance provisions would be met, but where the 
threshold under the treaty Commentary at 9.5 is not reached.
71
 In practice 
however, one would have to come to the conclusion that the thresholds 
are the same.  Arguably, the inference is that having taken no steps 
comparable to those in Canada and Australia, the New Zealand 15 
Parliament is content to allow New Zealand taxpayers to use structures 
that employ the provisions of tax treaties to avoid New Zealand income 
tax.
72
 This is an inference taken from New Zealand not including an 
express legislative override. 
 20 
This argument seems odd. This is because it does not make sense to 
have a different threshold. A Government will not be content to allow 
structures to help taxpayers avoid a domestic tax liability. A key focus 
of governments is reducing any barrier to trade by increasing the 
network of double tax treaties and protection that flows from them. 25 
For New Zealand, this focus was identified in a recent press release on 
the signing of the Australia/New Zealand double tax agreement. The 
media statement said that:
73
 
  
The new DTA will help to reduce barrier so trade and investment even 30 
further and improve certainty for trans-Tasman business. It will help 
to accelerate progress towards the full realisation of the goal of the 
‘Single Economic market’ to which the New Zealand and Australian 
  
71
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Prime Ministers have committed. One of the main features of the new 
double tax agreement will be lower withholding taxes on dividend and 
royalty payments between Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Thus, there is a focus from the Government to utilize double tax 5 
agreements. Certainty for trans-Tasman business will include certainty 
for governments in realising their internal revenue.   
2 When there is no direction from the treaty 
Consider a treaty between two countries that is silent about domestic 
general anti-avoidance rules. One country might have domestic general 10 
anti-avoidance rules and would apply those rules to a particular 
transaction while the other country may not have a general anti-
avoidance rule or would not apply the rule to the transaction in 
question.
74
  
 15 
According to Arnold, the effect of the current Commentary is that the 
onus is on the country without the anti-avoidance provisions (or 
disagreeing to their application) to put provisions in the treaty preventing 
the application of the first country’s anti-avoidance rules.
75
 However, it is 
questionable whether the provisions preventing the application would be 20 
a successful approach. Countries are unlikely to agree to provisions of 
double taxation agreements that would result in allowing abusive 
transactions that they could otherwise prevent through rules contained in 
their domestic law.
76
 Further, countries are unlikely to apply their 
international agreements in a way that would have this effect.
77
 This 25 
would mean that the guiding principle could create a standard to which a 
transaction would have to meet before a domestic anti-avoidance rule 
applies.
78
 
 
Similarly, if the treaty and domestic law contain similar anti-avoidance 30 
rules but the treaty is silent on their application, one argument is that it 
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would seem inappropriate to apply the broader domestic rules in the 
context of the agreement.
79
 The basis for this proposition is that there is a 
reasonable inference between the contracting States that they agreed on a 
narrower rule (i.e. the one contained in the treaty) than the broader 
domestic anti-avoidance rules. This argument has some merit. However, 5 
it does not void the application of the guiding principle completely. If the 
Commentary reflects the shared expectations and common understanding 
of the contracting States,
80
 then the guiding principle may still apply. 
This is because the treaty itself is silent to the application of the rules and 
thus remains open to some analysis and interpretation from the wider 10 
context of the treaty (of which the Commentary forms part of).  
 
It is worth noting that absent a tax treaty, there are no legal restraints 
on a country to counter tax-avoidance. This would mean that we could 
not read the guiding principle as establishing a general treaty anti-15 
avoidance rule. This is because the guiding principle would need to be 
explicitly included within the particular treaty to create a definite 
obligation on States. However, we can consider the guiding principle 
as outlining the approach to take when evaluating the relationship 
between domestic general anti-avoidance rules and tax treaties.
81
 20 
B Applying the principle 
From a practical point of view, the dichotomy presented by the 
Commentary is not effective in creating any certainty of the law for 
taxpayers. One benefit of the guiding principle is that it establishes a 
consistent test to apply when looking to the application of domestic 25 
general anti-avoidance rules. Understanding the relationship will assist 
with predicting potential tax outcomes of transactions. 
 
However, what the guiding principle requires us to analyse is whether 
there is a bona fide business purpose or economic substance. Even 30 
with the restriction of “main purpose” in the guiding principle of the 
Commentary, it is difficult to define what a main purpose is, or what it 
  
79
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looks like. Logically, targeted avoidance is evasion,
82
 but whether 
structural avoidance is included, or what the other purposes necessary 
for consideration are, would be difficult to articulate.  
 
Uncertainty as to what transactions fall into unacceptable tax 5 
avoidance (and therefore under the scope of the general anti-
avoidance rule) could raise concerns as to the justifiability of the 
guiding principle and the use of general anti-avoidance rules 
generally.
83
  
 10 
VI Retrospect and certainty: Rule of Law Considerations 
A Justified uncertainty 
The ability to rely on a treaty and the outcome it prescribes is 
important.
84
 However, tax law is inherently uncertain. Further, one of 
the purposes of the general anti-avoidance rules is to stop avoidance.  15 
This strengthens the coherent structure in place to facilitate 
international business and protect domestic interests. 
 
Further, concerns as to the justifiability of general anti-avoidance rules 
because of the uncertainty they may create assume that tax planning 20 
deserves the same respect as planning to make legitimate tax profits. It 
is one thing to say certainty and respect of commercial and tax 
consequences were intended by Parliament. It is another thing to say 
that that certainty and respect should extend to transactions designed 
to avoid liability. For example, if savings through Kiwisaver, as a 25 
compulsory scheme, were taxed at the maximum rate taxpayers would 
have a legitimate grievance. The incentive of the scheme is that it is 
cheaper than the normal tax rate. However, the predominant incentive 
of double taxation treaties is not to allow taxpayers to avoid domestic 
  
82
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liability by exploiting differences between two countries’ tax laws.
85
 
Consequently, taxpayers cannot have the same expectation of absolute 
certainty as to what liability a transaction will attract if they are 
planning to secure benefits from the treaty that were unintended by 
Parliament. 5 
 
One of the main criticisms of domestic general anti-avoidance rules is 
that their inherent vagueness fails to provide guidance to taxpayers.
86
 
This would breach one of the requirements of the rule of law.
87
 
Despite this, the rules are effective in allowing governments to 10 
recover revenue they would otherwise lose from the transaction.
88
 
Without a general anti-avoidance rule, there is likely to be a great 
extent of tax avoidance and revenue loss that governments cannot 
prevent.
89
  
 15 
As a result, while domestic general anti-avoidance rules may lack rule 
of law certainty, the practicality required in maintaining the integrity 
of a domestic system remains important. The general anti-avoidance 
rule is designed to frustrate tax avoidance. This can include situations 
where a taxpayer is taking advantage of double taxation agreements to 20 
utilise the benefit in a way that undermines the ability of a country to 
tax the transaction properly. The protection of a domestic tax base 
needs to be the single most important factor in the consideration of the 
relationship between general anti-avoidance rule and treaties. This is 
because unlike other areas of law, the international component of 25 
income taxation has an ability to completely undermine the revenue 
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stream of a state. Taxpayer certainty in cross-border transactions will 
fall secondary to these considerations. This is because losses to State 
revenue have the potential to affect taxpayers as well. Among other 
effects, tax avoidance has the ability to “reduce the effectiveness of 
welfare systems”.
90
  As a consequence, the oft-quoted dictum from 5 
Lord Tomlin in Duke of Westminster that “every man is entitled if he 
can to order his affairs so that tax attaching under the appropriate Act 
is less than it otherwise would be”
91
 is now subject to the qualification 
that taxpayers cannot participate in impermissible international tax 
avoidance.  10 
 
It is worth noting that income tax law may be one of those circumstances 
where “certainty should not be the overriding aim and where, in any 
event it may be elusive or even undesirable”.
92
  
B Pacta Sunt Servanda 15 
Further, the principle of pacta sunt servanda would suggest that the use 
of the guiding principle and domestic anti-avoidance rules should not 
undermine or violate the agreement as made. The approach taken by the 
Netherlands and Portugal reflects the basic public international law idea 
of pacta sunt servanda – or the idea that “agreements must be kept”.
93
 20 
The primacy of the treaty arrangements reflects the idea that agreements 
between treaty parties are inviolable. The ability to rely on the treaty and 
the outcome prescribed by it is an important consideration of certainty 
and consistency in cross-border investment operations.  
 25 
Absent a tax treaty, there are no legal restraints on a country other than 
those generally under its domestic law or international law to counter tax 
avoidance. The question then becomes how the prevention of tax 
avoidance can be a specific goal of a tax treaty if the only potential effect 
  
90
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is to limit anti-avoidance measures that may be available.
94
 Potentially it 
cannot.  As a result, there could be an argument to interpret the guiding 
principle differently (that is, not implicitly creating a framework for the 
operation of anti-avoidance rules). This could mean that the guiding 
principle needs to be explicitly included in the agreement in order to 5 
inform analysis of the effect of the domestic general anti-avoidance rule 
on a particular treaty.  Another potential solution could be for a provision 
allowing the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules to be included 
in the treaty.
95
  
 10 
Alternatively, the wider context of treaty interpretation suggests this 
may not be required. While the Commentary provides for a purpose of 
tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance, it is not the sole or most 
important purpose. The most important purpose of tax conventions is 
to facilitate international trade and investment through the elimination 15 
of double taxation.
96
  However, it is also a purpose of tax conventions 
to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.
97
  Thus, tax avoidance is only 
one consideration to take into account when evaluating the context of 
the Convention. Consequently, the wider context and purpose of the 
treaty is likely to carry more weight than the vague purpose 20 
highlighted in the Commentary.
98
  
 
In some ways, this wider context mirrors the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.
99
 According to paragraph 9.3 of the Commentary on 
Article 1, the ability to disregard a transaction entered into with the 25 
intention of obtaining unintended benefits arises partially from the 
application of the obligation to interpret tax treaties in good faith.
100
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Consequently, the approach is more purposive and looks to wider 
context, object and purpose of the treaty itself.  
 
A supporting argument is that the Commentary on Article 1 reflects 
the shared expectations and common understanding of the contracting 5 
States with respect to the relationship between tax treaties and 
domestic anti-avoidance rules, unless there is something explicit in the 
treaty to indicate otherwise. However, this does not necessarily 
exclude the legitimate use of domestic anti-avoidance rules to prevent 
tax avoidance and the receipt of undue benefits from double tax 10 
agreements. This argument would apply to any treaty based upon the 
model commentary but has more merit for treaties concluded between 
OECD Member countries.
101
  
 
Craig Elliffe essentially argues that those countries that place more 15 
importance on their treaties overriding the domestic general anti-
avoidance rule value most the certainty of law whereas those countries 
that place most importance on their domestic anti-avoidance provisions 
overriding the treaty, value most their ability to preserve the tax base and 
strike down abusive transactions.
102
 Consequently, a hybrid approach 20 
which allows the override of the treaty by the domestic general anti-
avoidance rule save in conflicting situations may achieve a compromise 
by creating clear treaty outcomes and guarding against the abuse of 
treaties.
103
 The guiding principle could inform this inquiry by creating a 
framework and obvious tests for transactions. From a practical point of 25 
view, this is considerably stronger than the misguided approaches of the 
wider interpretation framework the Commentary sets down.  
 
VII Conclusions 
Whether taxpayers can rely on the outcome predicated by a tax treaty 30 
in the case of a conflict with a domestic general anti-avoidance rule is 
a matter of much debate and interpretation. The growth in avoidance 
activity is a matter of concern due to the negative impact on the 
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capacity of national tax jurisdictions to collect the revenue they 
require.
104
 
 
Cross-border transactions, especially those involving tax havens and 
conduit companies pose a serious and significant threat to domestic tax 5 
bases. In an increasingly international business climate, the operation of 
protective domestic anti-avoidance rules and their relationship with 
double tax agreements is an important question to consider in 
international tax planning.  
 10 
The guidance principle is an aspiration of the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs and is a strong statement of the circumstances where treaty 
benefits arising from transactions should be denied.  This paper argues 
that the weight and usefulness of the Commentary lies in the guiding 
principle alone and not in the interpretation provisions. The wider 15 
approaches, while not clearly subject to the accusation of agency 
capture, are confusing and add little to the analysis. Commentators 
should treat the two approaches with less weight and more focus 
should rest upon understanding what an internationally accepted bona 
fide business purpose or economic substance of a transaction would 20 
be.  
Word count 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
and bibliography) comprises approximately 6,620 words. 
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